19 October 2014
This report synthesizes findings of evaluations conducted between July 2013 and July 2014, covering 12 operations with a combined planned value of USD 3 billion (totaling over USD 1.7 billion funded), which targeted 14.3 million beneficiaries a year, were of varying types, durations and sizes and implemented in diverse settings.
The evaluations found all operations cohered well with national and sector policy frameworks. WFP is directly influencing policy and strategy formulation, and increasingly engaging in joint programming. WFP delivered broadly relevant food assistance, with most operations appropriate to overall needs; however, insufficient differentiation in the analysis and planning of some operations compromised planning for specific beneficiary needs. Results were inadequately documented, particularly at the outcome level, mainly because of weak monitoring systems. Evaluations revealed that the full extent of WFP’s achievements – and under-achievements – is not currently reflected in reporting systems. General food distribution, school feeding and nutrition activities delivered well against coverage targets, with weaker performance in food assistance for assets. Evidence found that WFP served beneficiaries with less food than planned, however. Gender sensitivity was limited.
At the outcome level, WFP made most progress under Strategic Objective (SO) 1 - saving lives. Only limited data were available on SO2 (preventing acute hunger and investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation) and SO5 (capacity-development). Assessment of efficiency and sustainability was shallow; few operations were characterized as generally efficient or potentially sustainable.
External factors affecting results include WFP’s complex operating terrain and funding. Internal factors are symptomatic of an organization in transition, progressing in introducing changes, but with business processes needing to adapt. The lessons presented in this synthesis report aim to support WFP as it becomes increasingly fit for purpose.
5 February 2014
The evaluation covers the operation Regional EMOP 200438 Assistance to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Affected by Insecurity in Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger (2012-2013). It was intended for both accountability and learning and focuses on assessing: i) the appropriateness and coherence of the operation; ii) its results; and iii) the factors explaining the results.
The evaluation assessed the nutritional support to refugees and internally displaced persons delivered throughout: general food distribution; cash and food for assets; nutritional support to children under five, pregnant and lactating women; supplementary feeding to infants aged 6-59 months; and school feeding.
The evaluation, which makes a number of recommendations for the future, was managed and conducted by a consultancy firm, with fieldwork taking place in 2014.
31 May 2013
This report presents the findings of the May 2013 UNHCR/WFP Joint Assessment Mission that evaluated food and nutrition security conditions in the camp host communities one year after the outbreak of the crisis. The JAM exercise was intended to allow UNHCR and WFP to improve assistance programs and develop a joint plan of action for 2013 –2014. The JAM relied on a secondary data review, and primary data collection in Mbera camp and in host communities.
30 April 2012
Une évaluation qualitative sur la base de discussions de groupe et d’entretien avec des informateurs clés dans des villages ciblés a été conduites afin d’avoir un premier aperçu de la situation des populations hôtes permettant de mettre en place rapidement des actions d’atténuation de leurs conditions. La mission a été conduite dans des conditions sécuritaires tendues ce qui a limité le choix des villages visités. En effet, l’équipe était contrainte de se déplacer sous escorte en sachant que c’est la même escorte qui assurait la sécurité des équipes humanitaires qui travaillent sur le camp de Mberra et le village de Fassala. Au début neuf villages ont été choisis sur la base de leur proximité ou de leur éloignement du camp de Mberra et le village de Fassala. La densité démographique était également prise en compte dans le choix des villages. Finalement l’indisponibilité des escortes a contraint la mission à exclure trois villages sur les neuf identifiés au départ. Ces trois villages étaient ceux considérés comme étant les plus éloignés du camp et ainsi étaient supposés être moins exposés à l’influence du camp.